Reasoning with Models: What we can and cannot learn from Thought Experiments
Sprache des Vortragstitels:
Englisch
Original Kurzfassung:
Imaginaries, utopias, and other models play a pivotal role in arguments, discussions, and criticisms in the social sciences as well as in public discourse. However, methodologists? attempts to reconstruct the logic of how we ?reason with models? remain sketchy and contested (see e.g. Sugden 2002, Morgan & Stapleford 2023, Jhun 2021, Linsbichler 2023). Acknowledging that the relation between models and thought experiments is contested (see e.g. Reiss 2016, Thoma 2016), this talk targets four objectives.
First, I provide a logically sound account of reasoning with models as centrepieces of thought experiments by refining Häggqvist?s (2009) template for thought experiments (see Linsbichler & Cunha 2023).
Second, selected examples, ranging from the conceptual foundations of economics to public discourse preceding the German Energy Transition, illustrate the wide applicability of the refined template in the social sciences and in political economy (Linsbichler & Cunha 2023, Cunha & Linsbichler 2024).
Third, I solve a logical problem with Häggqvist?s template raised by Mulder & Muller (2023). Yet, the solution accentuates the problematic ambiguity of thought-experimenting in natural languages.
Finally, I argue that some instances of reasoning with models do not qualify as thought experiments, let alone fit the template without distortion. Having said that, Häggqvist?s proposal can serve as an impetus to construct additional templates to capture other modes of reasoning with models.
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