Wilhelm Kohler,
"Do Trading Blocs Enhance the Case for Strategic Trade Policy?"
, in K.E. Maskus, P.M. Hooper, E.E. Leamer and J.D. Richardson: Quiet Pioneering: Robert M. Stern and His International Economic Legacy, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Seite(n) 193-227, 1997, In: Maskus,K.E., P.M. Hooper, E.E. Leamer, and J.D. Richardson (eds.), Quiet Pioneering: Robert M. Stern and His International Economic Legacy, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997, S. 193-227.
Original Titel:
Do Trading Blocs Enhance the Case for Strategic Trade Policy?
Sprache des Titels:
Englisch
Original Buchtitel:
Quiet Pioneering: Robert M. Stern and His International Economic Legacy
Englische Kurzfassung:
Will the incentives to pursue strategically motivated trade or industrial policies rise or fall if countries form trading blocs? Economists have emphasized that one of the principal channels for welfare gains of Europe 1992 is a reduction of intra-European real trade costs. This paper identifies the spillover effects that such trade cost reductions might have on industrial policies aimed at strategic distortions in oligopolistic industries. We use a conjectural variations oligopoly model covering three countries, whose governments choose a general production subsidy/tax to target international strategic distortions. Integration is modeled as a reduction of trade costs for two of these countries, and we analyse how this affects outcome in an non-cooperative policy game.
Veröffentlicher:
The University of Michigan Press
Verlagsanschrift:
Ann Arbor
Seitenreferenz:
193-227
Erscheinungsjahr:
1997
Notiz zum Zitat:
In: Maskus,K.E., P.M. Hooper, E.E. Leamer, and J.D. Richardson (eds.), Quiet Pioneering: Robert M. Stern and His International Economic Legacy, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997, S. 193-227.