René Riedl,
"Asymmetrical Information and Opportunism in IS Outsourcing: Exploring the Relevance of Service Level Agreements"
, in Palvia, Shailendra; Agrawal, Sumesh: The 2005 Center for Global Outsourcing 4th Annual International Outsourcing Conference, Seite(n) 48-55, 2005
Original Titel:
Asymmetrical Information and Opportunism in IS Outsourcing: Exploring the Relevance of Service Level Agreements
Sprache des Titels:
Englisch
Original Buchtitel:
The 2005 Center for Global Outsourcing 4th Annual International Outsourcing Conference
Original Kurzfassung:
There is empirical evidence that in most IS outsourcing relationships information is distributed asymmetrically in favor of the service provider. Assuming that the service provider is behaving opportunistically, the outsourcing success is at risk from the customer’s point of view. This
paper analyzes the role of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) to mitigate three different situations of asymmetrical information: hidden information, hidden action, and hidden intention.
Forschungs-