In this project, I explore the consequences of informal incentives on the motivation and productivity
of employees. Moreover, I analyze which factors determine the effectiveness of informal incentives
and which role institutions play in that respect. The studies are based on theoretical models of ?relational contracts? which are used to generate predictions which subsequently are tested empirically.
Relational contracts work better with a higher future value of an employment relationship, which
itself is affected by aspects such as growth, interest rates, and generally the perceived stability of
employment relationships. The empirical analysis is based on administrative register data which is
matched with individual health care data in Upper Austria. The motivation of employees is proxed by
their sick-leave takeup, in particular if the weather is nice. The project approaches three questions:
What is the impact of the generosity of unemployment benefits on the motivation of employees? How
do employees react to mass layoffs by the firm they work for? How does a firm?s financing structure
interact with their employee?s motivation, and which role do corporate taxes play?
Key words: Informal incentives, institutions, worker motivation, administrative data